Order 25(1), C.I. 47 permits the court to grant an injunction by an interlocutory order in all cases where same is considered just or convenient.

Order 25 r (7) permits an application to be made ex parte in situations of urgency. An applicant who comes ex parte must first prove to the court that there was urgency about his or her case.

In Barclays Bank of Ghana Ltd v Ghana Cable Co Ltd [1998-1999] SCGLR 1 at p. 7, it was held per

Acquah JSC (as he then was):

"Now, on the basis of this well-settled principle, ex parte applications and orders for injunctions are undoubtedly anomalies in our administration of justice. And had the Rules of Court not permitted such applications and order to be made, they would have been nullities.

Thus to prevent the misuse of ex parte applications for injunctions, the practice, as sanctioned by case law, is that such applications are to be resorted to only in cases of extreme emergency, where the interest of justice requires that the court should intervene immediately without notice to the party affected.

Thus implies that the urgent situation must be such that it would be improper or even imprudent to give notice of the application to the other party. And if a court is satisfied that the situation is urgent enough to require its intervention, the ex parte order that the very limited time of about seven days"

Other cases speaking to the same issue are Ansah v Ansah [1977] 2 AIIER 638 at 642 and The Trustees of the Savour Church of Ghana v Essien & Anor [1984-86] 1 GLR 265. Order 25 stipulates a ten day life span for interlocutory injunction orders made ex parte.

When I perused the applicants motion and the annexures, the following came out:

a)    The applicants were vetted on 25 May 2018.

b)    When they were disqualified, they petitioned the defendant party on 29 may 2018.

c)    Even though they claim that their petition has not been addressed, they waited from 25 May or 29 May 2018, to 21 June 2018 to issue the writ of summons.

d)    This application for interlocutory injunction was also filed on 21 June, 2018.

e)    Meanwhile, the congress they want to injunct is fixed for 23 June 2018.

The applicants know or ought to know that by this hour, all preparations for the congress have been completed. Delegates may have began to arrive. Accommodation would have been booked. Food drinks and conference facilities would have been arranged. For a suit; and worse still, an order of interlocutory injunction to pop up upon the delegates will be a surprise of a lifetime.

The damage that will result from such an order will be incaculable. The applicants have not even filed an undertaken to pay the damages that will result, should the application be granted and their suit fail. Even though the congress is to be held tomorrow, the urgency was imposed by the applicants on themselves when they failed to act timeously for close to a month, when they had the window to act.

One cannot complain about a self-inflicted pain. The applicants pray the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. But delay defeats equity.

In Martey v Appeadu (No2) [1992-93] GBR 299, the Court of Appeal held in holding (1):

"Delay was a good ground for a court to refuse to grant an application for interlocutory injunction..."

See also Chief Tsokosi v Alhaji Abbas (1972] 1 GLR 257. In Smith v Clay [1967] 3 Bro. C.C. 639n; 646n; 29 E.R. 742, 744, Lord Candem L.C. held:

"A court of equity... has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time.

Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing.

The applicants slept on their rights. They were passive. They acquiesced and did not exercise reasonable diligence. In the circumstances, there is no justification for the grant of their application. It will be both not just and fair to grant it. I dutifully dismiss the application for lack of merit.