IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE HIGH COURT (GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION, COURT 6)
ACCRA - A.D 2019
THE REPUBLIC - (Plaintiff)
THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE, GA TRAD’NAL COUNCIL - (Respondent)
EX PARTE : SHERIFF NII OTO DODOO GROUP -(Applicant)
NII AMO BEESHEO AND 6 OTHERS - (Interested Parties)
DATE: 20TH FEBRUARY, 2019
SUIT NO: GJ/1224/2018
JUDGES: HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE KWEKU T. ACKAAH-BOAFO
FRANCIS OSEI NSIAH FOR THE RESPONDENT
ALEX GYAMFI FOR THE INTERESTED PARTIES
 This is an application brought under Order 80 Rule 4 (1) and Order 55 Rule 4 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure), 2004 (CI 47) for leave to extend time to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this court for judicial review in the nature of Certiorari to quash the Ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council dated April 20, 2016 on grounds of want of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, illegality and nullity.
 By Order 55 Rule 1 of CI 47 an application for:
(a) An order in the nature of Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari or Quo Warranto; or
(b) An injunction restraining a person from acting in any public office in which the person is not entitled to act; or
(c) Any other injunction shall be made by way of an application for judicial review to the High Court.
 The Supreme Court per Adinyira JSC aptly stated the law that it is a basic principle of common law that Certiorari and Prohibition would be automatically granted to quash a judgment and to prevent a biased judge from hearing a suit upon satisfactory proof of breach of any principles of the rules of natural justice .
 Based on the affidavit evidence, the questions for my resolution are: has the Applicant made a case sufficient enough to entitle him to the orders he seeks? And as opposed and articulated by the Respondents’ Counsel, has the Applicant come to Court too late in the day for the order he seeks by filing the instant application more than two years after the decision was made? Also, based on the law does this Court have the powers to grant the orders the Applicant seeks? These are the premises on which I shall proceed to consider the present application. It is however, convenient, before outlining the issues raised in this instant application, to chronicle in brief the respective claims of the parties as contained in the depositions of the affidavits filed and the arguments of Counsel.
ii. The Case of the Applicant as Per the Affidavit Evidence:
 In a 14-paragraph affidavit supporting the motion paper, sworn to by the Applicant on July 30, 2018 and filed at the registry of this Court on August 2, 2018, it is the case of the Applicant that on the 11th day of June, 2013 the Interested Parties herein filed a Petition against him at the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council. A copy of the application is attached as Exhibit “A”. According to the Applicant, the Respondent in its ruling dated 20th day of April, 2016 “restrained me from holding myself as the Mantse of Mayera Okaiman and appointed the 1st Interested Party as the Regent or acting Mantse of Mayera Okaiman pending the determination of the Petition at the Respondent”. A document titled “Formal Order of Interlocutory Injunction Pursuant to Ruling” was attached as Exhibit “B”.
 The Applicant has further averred that “I appealed against the Ruling of the Respondent at the Judicial Committee of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs. See Exhibit “C”. That after the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs, I engaged the services of a different lawyer who advised me to conduct a search at the National House of Chiefs, Kumasi to ascertain whether all the panel members of the Judicial Committee that sat on the case have their names registered as chiefs in the register of the National House of Chief as chiefs”.
 The further deposition of the Applicant is that by a “letter dated the 18th day of May, 2018 at the instance of our family, my lawyer applied to the National House of Chiefs for a search on the panel members that sat on the case to ascertain if all of them have their names registered in the register of National House of Chiefs as chiefs”. According to him the search was answered on the 12th day of July, 2018 by the Registrar of the National House of Chiefs and it revealed that two (2) of the members of the panel that sat on the case have their names registered in the National House of Chiefs. However, one of them, Numo Ogbarmey III, the 3rd member of the panel is not registered as a chief in the National Register of Chiefs. The Applicant attached as Exhibits “D, D1 and D2” being the letter from his Counsel to the National House of Chiefs in Kumasi and Extracts from the National Register of Chiefs.
 The Applicant has further deposed that “I am advised by my lawyer and I verily believe same to be true that since one of the panel members is not a registered chief, he could not be a member of the Ga Traditional Council and a member of the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council to cloth him any adjudicating powers to sit as a panel member of the Judicial Committee”. He also deposed at paragraph 10 of the supporting affidavit that “I am therefore further advised due to the afore mentioned reason, the Ruling of the Judicial Committee restraining me as a chief and appointing the 1st Interested Party as a Regent was without jurisdiction and is tainted with illegality and therefore void ab initio and ought to be set aside”.
 According to the Applicant by the time it came to his knowledge that the Ruling of the Judicial Committee is tainted with illegality and a nullity the time limited under the rules to quash the Ruling of the Respondent by Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari had elapsed. He has further deposed that “I am advised by my lawyer and verily believe to be true that the Honourable Court has the powers to enlarge time to quash the decision of the Judicial Committee particularly as it has been delivered without jurisdiction and is tainted with illegality and a nullity”. He has also deposed that “I am further advised that the Honourable Court has the supervisory powers to quash the Ruling of the Respondent Judicial Committee on the afore-stated grounds”.
iii. The Affidavits in Opposition:
 The Registrar of the Ga Traditional Council, Mercy Asante has deposed to a 10 paragraph affidavit in opposition to the application. According to her per the records at the Registry of the Ga Traditional Council the Applicant is not and has not been a Mantse of Mayera Okaiman. According to Ms. Asante “the records at the Registry of the Ga Traditional Council show that the Applicant has allegedly represented himself as the Mantse of Mayera Okaiman and this has been challenged by the Interested Parties”.
 The deponent confirmed that “on the 20th day of April, 2016 the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council restrained the Applicant from holding himself out in any manner whatsoever to be the Mantse of Mayera Okaiman pending the hearing and determination of this suit”. According to the deponent the Respondent had jurisdiction to restrain the Applicant and therefore the instant applicant should be dismissed.
 According to the Respondent “the Applicant has waited or slept for over two years and is now asking for extension of time for judicial review. That the time within which the Applicant is entitled to apply for judicial review has long passed. That I am advised by Counsel and believe same to be true that the delay is inordinate and that the law including equity frowns upon such conduct”. The deponent has also averred that the instant application is an abuse of the Court process and same must not be entertained because “the right to appeal is not absolute and in this situation, the Applicant has lost such right”. The Respondent has therefore prayed the Court to refuse the application.
 The interested parties are also collectively opposed to the application. An affidavit in opposition to the application was filed on November 21, 2018 by Nii Amo Beesheo of Mamprobi, Accra on his own behalf and that of the others. Nii Amo Beesheo has deposed that the Applicant is not and has not been a Mantse of Mayera Okaiman whether in fact or in law. According to him “there is a Mantse installment process of the people of Mayera and the Applicant has not gone through that custom neither was he considered for it”. According to the interested parties the Applicant started holding himself out as Mantse of Mayera Okaiman and so a due process was initiated and he was duly restrained by the Respondent.
 It is the further case of the Interested Parties that the Respondent had the jurisdiction to restrain the Applicant. They also contend that “all the members of the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council that sat on the case involving the Applicant determined that the Applicant is not a Mantse of the Mayera Okaiman were competent in fact and in law” According to the deponent “Numo Ogbarmey III a member of the Respondent is in fact and in law competent” and therefore it is the case of the Interested Parties that the decision taken by the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council is competent in law.
 According to the deponent of the affidavit for the Interested Parties “Numo Ogbarmey III a Traditional Priest (Wulomo) was sworn in to be a member of the Respondent on September 19th 2013 by a Justice of the High Court. A copy of the ‘Judicial Oath” administered is attached as Exhibit “NAB 1”. It is also the further case of the Interested Parties that “the said authority reposed in Numo Ogbarmey III has not been revoked and same has been duly exercised in a number of cases that came before the Respondent. See Exhibit NAB 2”. According to the Interested Parties “Numo Ogbarmey has never represented himself as a Chief or King of any of the Ga Traditional State”.
 In responding to the Applicant’s request for extension of time by the Applicant, the Interested Parties have deposed that the Applicant “has waited or slept for over two years and is now asking for extension of time for judicial review”. According to the deponent the delay is inordinate and therefore the Court should not entertain the application at all. They have therefore prayed the Court to refuse the application.
iv. Arguments of Counsel in Support of the Application:
 In moving the application learned Counsel for the Applicant relied on the affidavit depositions and the statement of case filed and submitted that based on the materials filed though the application was filed out of time it is a proper application. Counsel submitted that the filing of the application out of time is the reason why they are first invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to extend the time.
 Mr. Fosu Gyeabour referred the Court to the cases cited in his statement of case such as the REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, ACCRA EX PARTE PUPULAMPO (1991) 2 GLR 472, THE REPUBLIC V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, EX PARTE ABBEY [1993-94] GBR 1077 and REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, KUMASI, EX PARTE ABUBAKARI (No. 1) [1998-99] SCGLR 84 to submit that this Court has the power to entertain the instant application for extension of time together with the application for judicial review.
 Learned Counsel further submitted that even though in the Supreme Court unreported case of REPUBLIC v. WASSA FIASE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL & NANA AKWASI SOMPREY II, EX PARTE ABUSUAPAYIN KOFI NYAMEKYE & 3 OTHERS CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/55/2014 the court held that no Court has the discretion to extend the time for the filing of judicial review if not filed within the stipulated time, according to Mr. Fosu Gyeabour based on special circumstances time can be extended. Counsel further submitted that in his view because the categories of special circumstances are not closed it is “our humble contention that the instant application seeks to abate illegality, being a decision of court or judicial body presided over by a person who is not a proper member of the panel”. To Counsel the grounds been canvassed in this application constitute special circumstance.
 Learned Counsel further submitted that the uncontested evidence is that Numo Ogbarmey III who sat on the matter for the decision which is being impugned is not a number of the Ga Traditional Council (GTC) because his name is not in the National Register of Chiefs. That being so, according to Counsel he should not have been selected to be a member of the panel and therefore his involvement is an illegality and so is the decision made. Counsel submitted that by Sections 59 and 62 of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) persons installed as chiefs must have their names registered in the National Register of Chiefs. He also submitted that by Section 14 of Act 759 and Regulations 3(1) of the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions), (Traditional Councils Regulations) 1972 (L.I. 779) also provides that “only members of the Traditional Council could be members of the Judicial Committee”.
 Counsel further submitted that “we are of the view that illegality is one of the exceptional circumstances” and relied on the case of the REPUBLIC v. CAPE COAST DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, EX PARTE AMOO (1976) 1 GLR 116 for the submission and said the case at bar is similar. Counsel conceded that the Applicant took part in the proceedings but his former counsel choose to appeal after the ruling hence the delay in filing the instant application. That notwithstanding according to Counsel because the issue raised borders on jurisdiction the delay is well-explained.
 Finally, Counsel in response to the Respondent and the Interested Parties’ contention that Nuumo Ogbaaney was sworn in by a Judge, submitted that they are not contesting same but only wish to say, “that will still not qualify him to sit as a panel member” because of the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act and the Regulations. Based on all of the above Counsel submitted that because the decision made was illegal same is a nullity and so it is as if the decision did not take place. He therefore prayed the Court to exercise its jurisdiction to extend the time and to quash the decision.
v. Arguments of Counsel Against the Grant of the Application:
 In arguing against the application learned Counsel for the Interested Parties Mr. Alex Gyamfi relied on the Statement of Case filed on January 10, 2019 and all the cases stated therein.
Counsel submitted that based on the law as provided for under Order 55 Rule 3 of C.I. 47 the application should have been filed about six months after the impugned decision and not later than that time. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant has slept on his right as the application was filed more than two years after the decision.
 In this case Counsel further submitted that there is no justification for the delay because the Applicant was party to the decision at the Ga Traditional Council and has admitted that he filed an appeal to challenge the decision but he failed to pursue the said appeal. According to learned Counsel by filing the appeal it is clear that the Applicant had notice of the decision and so the exception stated in the case of REPUBLIC v. WASSA FIASE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL & NANA AKWASI SOMPREY II, EX PARTE ABUSUAPAYIN KOFI NYAMEKYE SUPRA does not avail him.
 Learned Counsel further submitted that all the members who sat on the matter as members were qualified. In any case, according to Counsel the cases such as DOKU v PRESBY CHURCH [2005-2006] SCGLR 700, FRIMPONG v OPOKU 1963 2GLR together with the Supreme Court holding in the WASSA FIASE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL case held that in a matter like this the facts do not matter. According to Counsel in this case the alleged illegality does not matter because six months has elapsed since the decision he is challenging was made. Counsel also submitted that the fact that the Applicant was ignorant of the timelines and the law does not matter and therefore he urged on the Court to dismiss the application.
 I note that Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Osei Nsiah, informed the Court that he relied entirely on the statement of case filed together with all the materials filed and the cases cited. He did not provide the Court with further oral submission. Suffice to say that I note that his position is in substance similar to the position of the Interested Parties. He also cited and mainly situated his submission on the WASSA FIASE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL and prayed the Court to dismiss the application.
vi. The Court’s Opinion and Analysis:
I now proceed to review and consider the arguments of Counsel in relation to the merits or otherwise of the instant application.
 The power of the High Court to exercise that supervisory jurisdiction to issue Prerogative Writs is provided in Article 141 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana. That provision of the law enacts:
“141. The High Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all lower Courts and any lower adjudicating authority, and may in the exercise of that jurisdiction, issue orders and directions for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory power.”
The prerogative orders contained in Article 141 have been held to be the mechanism whereby administrative law principles are applied .
vii. Writ of Certiorari: Scope and Ambit
 Judicial review in the nature of Certiorari is the procedure by which the superior court is able, in certain cases, to review the legality or otherwise, of decisions or actions by some state institutions including lower courts and adjudicating bodies which decisions/orders affect the rights of the members of the general public. The law is so wide to cover not only judicial acts but also administrative duties of public institutions and Officers who exercise discretionary powers. This system of judicial review, therefore, allows the courts to interfere in the machinery of public administration where circumstances warrant it.
 It is instructive from the outset to state categorically that an application for judicial review is different from an appeal in terms of their purpose and function. In a judicial review application, the Court is called upon to determine the appropriateness of a lower court or an administrative tribunal’s decision. A Judicial review is not the re-hearing of the merits of a particular case. In hearing an application for judicial review, the Court examines the decision to determine whether or not the decision-maker used the correct legal reasoning or followed the correct legal procedure. Therefore, in a judicial review the Court’s powers are limited to quashing and re-mitting only and nothing more. It cannot make consequential orders such as declarations. See the unreported Supreme Court case of THE REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ACCRA, EX PARTE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; PAPA KWESI NDUOM – INTERESTED PARTY – Civil Motion Number JS/7/2017 dated 7TH November 2016 and also the Australian case of ATTORNEY GENERAL [NSW] v. QUIN 170 CLR 1.
 Re-echoing the distinction, Bamford-Addo JSC (as she then was) is credited with that statement of law where she posited:
“It is to be noted that there is a clear distinction between Certiorari and appeal which is lost on litigants and their lawyers. When the High Court, a superior court, is acting within its jurisdiction its erroneous decision is normally corrected on appeal whether the error is one of fact or law. Certiorari however is a discretionary remedy which would issue to correct a clear error of law on the face of the Ruling of the court, or an error which amounts to lack of jurisdiction in the court so as to make the decision a nullity. In the case of error not apparent on the face of the Ruling or those of fact the avenue is by way of Appeal.”
 It is also now settled that a non-jurisdictional error committed by a lower tribunal or adjudicating body shall not be amenable to the Supervisory powers of the High Court and writs like Certiorari unless the error amounts to a patent error on the face of the record. See the case of MANSAH & OTHERS v. ADUTWUMWAA & OTHERS [2013- 2014] 1 SCGLR 38 @ Holding 4. Further, it should be noted that Certiorari is a discretionary remedy and that it is not always the case that Certiorari shall be granted automatically. In case of R v CIRCUIT COURT, ACCRA, EX PARTE KOMELEY ADAMS (2013) 1 SCGLR 111 @ 122, the Supreme Court speaking through that distinguished and eminent jurist, Date-Baah JSC postulated as follows:-
“…… Accordingly, in relation to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction also even an error patent on the face of the record cannot found the invocation of that jurisdiction of the court unless it is fundamental, substantial, material, grave or so serious as to go to the root of the matter. In sum, in addition to jurisdictional errors, only a fundamental non-jurisdictional error of law can be the basis for the exercise of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.”
 I have gone at length to review the law only to state and reiterate that, where the Court finds in an application for judicial review that a decision has been unlawfully made, the powers of the Court are limited to bringing up the decision for quashing and remitting the matter to the decision-maker or another person where the circumstance demands for reconsideration in accordance with law. In other words, a judicial review application is functionally different from an appeal, which is usually by way of re-hearing of the matter before the appellate court based on the whole record of appeal.
 Having looked at the scope of judicial review, I now proceed to consider the main issues raised by the instant application. The application turns on answers to the questions posed here below:
i) whether this Court can extend or enlarge the time for the Applicant to file the instant application; and
ii) whether or not the Applicant has made out a case for the grant of certiorari?
 A useful starting point obviously is to look at the procedural rule. Order 55 Rule 3 (1) (2) of C.I. 47 titled - Time for making application
3. (1) An application for judicial review shall be made not later than six months from the date of the occurrence of the event giving grounds, for making the application.
(2) Where an order of certiorari is sought in respect of any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the date of the occurrence of the event giving grounds for the making of the application shall be taken to be the date of that judgment, order, conviction or proceeding. (Emphasis Mine).
 To my mind the interpretation of the phrase “shall be made not later than six month from the date of occurrence” admits to no ambiguity and it stands out as the central part of the clause. It is trite learning that the use of “shall” in a text is imperative and not optional. To that extent, it is clear that an application for judicial review under the above clause ought to be made within six months. The question though is do I have the powers or the authority to extend the time as provided for under Order 80 Rule 4 (1)?
 The question was succinctly answered by the Supreme Court in the case which all the parties in this suit have relied upon; that is the case of REPUBLIC v. WASSA FIASE TRADITIONAL COUNCIL & NANA AKWASI SOMPREY II, EX PARTE ABUSUAPAYIN KOFI NYAMEKYE SUPRA. The brief facts are that the High Court at Tarkwa in the Western Region presided over by Ohene Essel J granted an extension of time to the Applicants to file a judicial review by Order 55 Rule 3 in September 2011. The impugned decision was made on December 8, 2005. After the grant of the extension, the Applicants filed the application for judicial review and same was subsequently heard by the Court after the Respondents responded to the application. The Learned High Court Judge, in dismissing the application for judicial review, first vacated the order for the extension of time in the following terms:
“On the 19/9/2011, the court granted the lawyer for the applicants leave to file the substantive application. I have painstakingly studied the rules governing the granting of such applications and I find that I did not have jurisdiction to grant leave for an extension of time to file the present application for judicial review in this matter since the decision to be quashed was taken on 8/12/2005”
 Being dissatisfied, the Applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal at Cape Coast but the Court speaking through Honyenuga J.A. on May 16, 2013 dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the application was void and therefore a nullity. The Applicants then appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the issues set down by the Supreme Court was:
“Whether the grant of leave for extension of time to bring an action to quash a decision that has been taken or made beyond the 6 (six) months period as stated in order 55 rule 3 of C.I. 47 is null and void and can be vacated suomoto by the trial judge”.
 Dotse JSC speaking for the majority Court after stating the procedural rule and analyzing many of the earlier cases including REPUBLIC v. ASOGLI TRADTITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS EX PARTE TOGBE AMORNI VII  2 GLR 347 and the seminal and celebrated case of MOSI v. BAGYINA  1 GLR 337 and other cases some of which have been cited in this matter by Counsel delivered himself that:
“I observe that the operative word in order 55 rule 3 of C.I.47 already referred to supra is “shall”. By the ordinary rules of interpretation, the Interpretation Act, Act 792 is to be applied to give meaning, and operation to the contents of order 55 r. 3 of C.I. 47.
This by my understanding means that the “shall” as used therein is to be construed imperatively and mandatorily to give meaning to the context in which the word “shall” has been used.
Going by that definition, the meaning ascribed to “shall” as used in Section 42 of Act 792 would mean that the expression ‘shall’ as used therein indicates that the period not later than six months from the date of the occurrence of the event giving grounds for making the application is to be applied to have mandatory and binding effect. In that respect, the effect would be that, judicial reviews shall not be entertained by the High Court beyond the period of six months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose”
 His Lordship Dotse further looked at Order 80 rules 4 (1) and (2) and concluded that because the provisions in under 80 uses the word “may”, by Section 42 of Act 792, it is permissive and empowering and not binding on the Court, as is the word shall which is mandatory. The Court it seems provided as exception when his Lordship stated that:
“However in clear cases where notice of the decision, order, judgment or proceedings in question had not been given to the applicant or would not have been known after due diligence, then in those circumstances only, extension of time may be granted reference to the date when the applicant ought to have been deemed to have had notice (after due diligence)”. [Emphasis Mine].
The position might therefore be stated that provisions in Order 55 rules 3 (1) and (2) of C.I. 47 does not admit the grant of extension of time to bring applications for judicial review outside the statutory six months period unless special circumstances exist, such as lack of notice to the party applying of the proceedings that that terminated in the decision, order, ruling, judgment or action that the subject matter of the judicial review seeks to quash or prohibit or as the case might be in appropriate cases”.
 Dotse JSC further stated that in circumstances where the Applicant for the judicial review had no notice of the impugned decision or the proceedings which is the subject matter of the judicial review, then time will not run against the person until he/she is notified and/or became aware after due diligence. In such cases according to the apex Court it should be possible to grant the extension of time.
 Applying the law as stated above to the facts at hand, and having reviewed all of the materials filed including the submission of Counsel, I am of the respectful view that none of the exceptions as stated by the Supreme Court exist in this case. The Applicant in this case concedes that he participated in the proceedings and therefore had notice of the ruling on April 20, 2016 when it was made. He has also conceded that he went ahead to file an appeal, which from the record is still pending. To contend that the time be extended for the judicial review to be filed on the sole ground that the ruling made is a nullity to my mind is without basis and just disingenuous. Even though I have found the arguments of Mr. Gyeabour, Counsel for the Applicant attractive, respectfully I am not persuaded by them and therefore I am unable to yield to the Applicant’s position. It should be noted that the law that gives the right to a person to come to court is the same law that in certain circumstances takes away that right. This is one of them. Undoubtedly, Dotse JSC’s elucidation of the law is a sound legal proposition which is backed by Order 55 Rules 1, 3 (1) & (2) quoted above. I am bound by it and I adopt same.
 Finally, based on the law, this court cannot extend the time for the Applicant’s judicial review to be determined but it does not mean that the Applicant’s allegation of the decision being illegal and a nullity cannot be investigated and pronounced upon. Based on the facts and arguments of Counsel it is clear that this matter is a cause or matter affecting Chieftaincy, therefore the proper forum for same to be litigated and adjudicated upon in my view is where the Applicant filed his appeal; that is the Regional House of Chiefs. Based on my appreciation and understanding of the law, the Judicial Committee of the Regional House of Chiefs has the authority and/or the jurisdiction to deal with the legal issue such as illegality of a decision and/or fraud and a void order.
 I note that the issue whether the traditional Councils can determine such a legal matter has long been determined by the Supreme Court in the case of the REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE ODONKORTEYE [1984-86] 2 GLR 148-165. In that case the facts from the head notes are that on the death of Nene Korle II, the stool occupant of the Tekperbiawe Division of Ada, a dispute arose between the second Applicant and the second Respondent as to which of them had been duly nominated, elected and installed as chief in succession to the deceased. Relying on a document described as "articles of agreement", the judicial committee of the Ada Traditional Council which adjudicated upon the matter found in favour of the second Applicant. Having lost the case, the second Respondent sought a remedy at the High Court, Accra and prayed for a declaration that the "articles of agreement" were a forgery or otherwise illegal and consequently the judgment of the Ada Traditional Council founded on it was null and void.
 The Supreme Court held that “the issues of fraud raised before the High Court were matters within the competence of the Ada Traditional Council which, like any other adjudicating body, had power to set aside its own judgment if such judgment was obtained by fraud”. In other words, the apex Court held in that case that the Judicial Committee of the Ada Traditional Council is competent as an adjudicating body to investigate the issues of fraud and if established set aside its own judgment. By parity of reasoning I am of the respectful opinion that the Applicant’s contention that because a member of the panel who made the decision of April 20, 2016 was not qualified and therefore the decision was illegal and a nullity can be dealt with by the Judicial Committee of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs.
 Based on all of the above, I end my analysis at the issue one set out above because it is not necessary to answer the second issue. I therefore hold based on the above analysis that this Court lacks the authority or the jurisdiction to extend the time for the application for judicial review to be filed. Consequently, the application for extension of time and for judicial review is DISMISSED.
 The Court awards cost of GH₵1,000.00 to the Respondent and each Interested Party is awarded GH₵1,000.00. The total cost against the Applicant therefore is GH₵5,000.00. I note that Counsel for the Interested Parties and Respondent asked for GH₵20,000 as Costs.
 R v High Court (Land Division) Accra; Ex Parte Alhassan Ltd (Thaddeus Sory – Interested Party) (2011) SCGLR 478 @ 484
 R v HIGH COURT ACCRA, EXPARTE: CHRAJ (2003-04) SCGLR 312 @ 324 per Date-Bah JSC
 R v High Court, Accra; Ex Parte Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries & Another (2003-04) SCGLR 348 @ 354
 Malik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),  F.C.J. No. 645.