BENEDICTA QUAO vs CHRISTIAN ACTION FAITH MINISTRY
  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
    IN THE HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION),
    ACCRA- A.D 2019
BENEDICTA QUAO - (Plaintiff)
CHRISTIAN ACTION FAITH MINISTRY - (Respondent)

DATE:  8 TH NOVEMBER 2018
SUIT NO:  RPC/289/13
JUDGES:  JENNIFER DODOO (MRS) JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT
LAWYERS:  ZIYERLEY AGBAMBILLA FOR PLAINTIFF EDNA
LOUISA AKULIGA FOR DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT

The pleadings of the parties to this suit show that a road traffic accident involving their vehicles occurred on 13th January 2013.      The Plaintiff who described herself as a Consultant and Lecturer, claimed against the Defendant, a Church, the following reliefs:

a. GH¢50,000.00 being the value of the damaged vehicle.

b. Damages for loss of the vehicle being GH¢150 per day from the date of the accident being January 13, 2013 to date of replacement of vehicle or date of final payment

c. Interest on damages from date of judgment till date of final payment.

d. Costs, including legal costs.

 

It was the Plaintiff’s case that on the day of the incident, the Defendant’s driver who was in charge of the Defendant’s vehicle negligently drove into her vehicle crushing it and damaging it beyond repair. The particulars of negligence were listed as:

a. He hit the Plaintiff from the rear

b. He drove too fast.

c. He was under the influence of alcohol.

d. Failed to keep a proper look out

e. Failed to stop, to slow down, to swerve or in any other way so to control the bus as to avoid hitting the Plaintiff’s car from the rear or at all.

 

It was her case that she and her children who were in the car with her suffered various degrees of injury and were traumatized in the process. It was her case that due to the injuries she had suffered, she had been experiencing excruciating pains in her back. The Defendant had failed to replace her vehicle and that she had had to incur huge expenses in hiring a taxi to transport her children to school and herself to work.

 

The Defendant denied any negligence and said the accident was not as a result of any act of commission or omission of its driver but rather due to circumstances beyond his control. The Defendant denied the contention that its driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the said accident. According to the Defendant, the Police advised both parties to make a claim with their respective insurers as neither party was at fault. It contended that the Plaintiff made a claim on her insurers as her vehicle was comprehensively insured and that the claim was fully settled. It therefore accused the Plaintiff of seeking to commit fraud by making claims against it. The Defendant gave the particulars of fraud as being:

a. The Plaintiff seeking to recover the cost of replacing the said damaged vehicle which insurers had already settled and paid to the Plaintiff before the Plaintiff instituted this instant action in Court.

b. By the Plaintiff jacking up the value of the damaged vehicle as per her claim from the Defendant in order to recover more than double the actual value of her said damaged vehicle.

 

The issues forwarded to this court for trial were:

1. Whether or not the Defendant’s driver negligently drove into the Plaintiff’s vehicle?

2. Whether or not the Plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the negligence of the Defendant’s driver?

3. Whether or not the Defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence of its driver?

4. Whether or not the Defendant’s driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident?

5. Whether or not the value of the Plaintiff’s damaged Kia Ronda vehicle at the time of the accident was worth GH¢50,000.00?

6. Whether or not the Plaintiff has been fully compensated by her insurer Metropolitan Insurance Company Ltd for the replacement of her damaged vehicle?

7. Whether or not the Plaintiff’s claim is vitiated by fraud?

8. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to her claim?

 

The Court will discuss the under-listed issues together as they are inextricably linked:

a)    Whether or not the Defendant’s driver negligently drove into the Plaintiff’s vehicle?

b)    Whether or not the Plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the negligence of the Defendant’s driver?

c)    Whether or not the Defendant’s driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident?

 

It was the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant’s driver was negligent and that it was his negligence which caused the accident. In her pleadings she gave the particulars of negligence as being:

a. He hit the Plaintiff from the rear

b. He drove too fast.

c. He was under the influence of alcohol.

d. Failed to keep a proper look out

e. Failed to stop, to slow down, to swerve or in any other way so to control the bus as to avoid hitting the Plaintiff’s car from the rear or at all.

 

In her witness statement, the Plaintiff averred that 4 vehicles were affected by the accident. The Defendant’s representatives at the scene admitted liability and promised to repair or replace all the vehicles damaged in the accident. She said this assurance was given both at the scene of the accident and at the police station when a formal complaint was lodged. The Exhibit A series are pictures of a vehicle with Registration No. GC 859-11. This is the vehicle described in the Police Report (Exhibit D) as belonging to the Plaintiff. The vehicle is crushed and the vehicle examiner in Exhibit D described it in the following words: “the extent of damage is beyond economic repairs”. This fact is corroborated by Exhibit 1 which is a report from Moonic Enterprise Ltd dated 25th January 2013. It states:

Due to the impact of the accident vehicle KIA RONDO with the car number GC 859-11 at the rear is beyond repairs.

The constructions of the rear body are integrated which also makes it impossible for repair works to take place. Though we (MOONIC AUTOCLINIC) can go on with a perfect replacement of the exact damaged parts and repair works, but there would be poor stability at rear after work is done.

In these cases for our (MOONIC AUTOCLINIC) professionalism we hereby recommend that the vehicle in question should be written off from the road due to potential risk to lives and properties.

 

In the case of Hazel v. British Transport Commission (1958) 1 WLR 169 @ 171 the court had this to say:

“The basic rule is that negligence consists in doing something which a reasonable man would not have done in that situation or omitting to do something which a reasonable man would have done in that situation.”

Also in the case of West African Bakery v. Miezah (1972) 1 GLR 78 @ 82, the court said:

The question whether a particular driver on the highway was exercising that degree of care and attention which a reasonable and prudent driver would exercise in a particular circumstance is one of fact.”

What were the facts which would establish negligence in this case?

 

The brief facts in Exhibit D states:

On 13th January 2013 at about 11:00 am, suspect driver John Nortey was driving International Bus No. GS 9221-09 along the Spintex Road from Action Chapel yard heading towards Tetteh Quarshie Interchange. On reaching a section of the road near the Accra Shopping Mall, he alleged his brakes failed to function and as a result ran into the offside front portion of a Toyota Camry saloon car No. GS 7707 Y and also went further to hit the rear portion of a KIA Ronda Car No. GC 859-11 which were heading towards the same direction. The driver in charge KIA Ronda, Benedicta Quao sustained injuries and had treatment at the Ridge Hospital. All three vehicles were damaged.

The result of the police action was that the case docket was closed as “Accidental” by the Unit Commander on the strength of the Testing Officer’s report in respect of accident vehicle No. GS 9221-09 on 17th January 2013. And what were the Testing Officer’s findings?

 

The Testing Officer’s findings which were incorporated into the police report (Exhibit D) shows as follows:

No. GS 9221-09: I examined the above-mentioned vehicle as requested by the officer in charge on 14th January 2013 at the Airport Police Station. The alleged brake system failure was critically examined and confirmed further investigation brought to the fore that the pipe that carries the brake fluid from the reservoir did suffer a cut hence loss of the fluid and as a result the accident. However the steer and the electrical system found to be serviceable prior to the accident. MECHANICAL FAILURE. Damages: Bonnet dented. Body Panel broken and bent. Front bumper and shells grille dented and bent.

 

The Plaintiff stated further that her vehicle was totally damaged and the Defendant’s transport officer sent her internet sites to look for a replacement car. According to her, the Defendant through its transport officer eventually suggested a KIA Sorento car which cost GH¢26,500.00. She said she then agreed to use the GH¢20,000.00 she had obtained from her insurers to purchase the vehicle with the Defendant providing money to top up the purchase.

 

However the Defendant later reneged on its promise necessitating the instant suit. The Plaintiff has pleaded the following particulars of negligence on the Defendant’s driver’s part:

a. He hit the Plaintiff from the rear

b. He drove too fast.

c. He was under the influence of alcohol.

d. Failed to keep a proper look out

e. Failed to stop, to slow down, to swerve or in any other way so to control the bus as to avoid hitting the Plaintiff’s car from the rear or at all.

 

In cross-examination on 16th and 17th April, 2018 the following was elicited from Plaintiff:

Q: Madam, when the accident occurred, your vehicle was crushed from the rear. Is that correct?

A: Yes. My Lord.

Q: And per the accident report, Exhibit D, it was alleged that the accident was due to brake failure. Is that correct?

A: Not wholly true.

Q: And so you would agree with me that the accident was due to or was caused by brake failure pursuant to your answer.

A: My answer was, not true.

Q: I suggest to you that your assertion that the driver was drunk on the day of the accident is untrue.

A: That was the fact.

Q: Yesterday, you saw a copy of the vehicle examiner’s report in the accident report. If you can refer to Exhibit C and specifically paragraph 9. Nowhere in that said report did the vehicle examiner indicate that the driver was drunk. Is that correct?

A: The accident report was actually requested when I had decided to go to the insurance company. That was when this was requested…….

Q: Madam, so you would agree with me that paragraph 9 of the said report, the vehicle examiner gave his expert opinion that the accident was due to brake failure. Is that correct?

A: Yes, My Lord as per this report.

Q: I put it to you that your assertion that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver who was drunk is untrue.

A: My Lord, as I have already stated, the circumstances under which this report was requested for, there was no way they would have known that the said vehicle was being driven by a drunkard.

Q: Are you suggesting that the said report which you attached and relied on as your evidence was forged?

A: No my Lord.

 

The Plaintiff is insistent that the accident was caused by the Defendant’s driver’s negligence and that the said driver was drunk.

However, neither the Police Report tendered in evidence as Exhibit D nor the Testing Officer’s findings corroborate the Plaintiff’s assertion that the driver drove too fast or was under the influence of alcohol. Section 7(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323 has it thus:

“Corroboration consists of evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn which confirms in a material particular the evidence to be corroborated and connects the relevant person with the crime, claim or defence.”

 

In the age old case of Mojolagbe v. Larbi and others (1959) GLR 190, the court had this to say:

“Where a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way e.g. by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances or circumstances and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness box and repeating this averment on oath or having it repeated on oath by his witnesses. He proves it by producing other evidence of facts and circumstances from which the court can be satisfied that what he avers is true.”

 

The court continued by saying:

Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means i.e. the establishment of an averment by admissible evidence. When a party makes an averment… he is unlikely to be held by the court to have sufficiently proved that averment by merely going into the witness box and repeating that averment on oath if he does not adduce that corroborative evidence which if his averment is true is bound to exist.”

 

In Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd (2010) SCGLR 728 @ 736, the court held:

It is a basic principle of the law on evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce the required evidence of the facts in issue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim may fail. The method of producing evidence is varied and includes the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence) without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the court or tribunal of fact such as a jury. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more reasonable than its non-existence.

 

The burden of persuasion and the obligation to adduce evidence are defined in Sections 10(1) and 11(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323).

Section 10(1)

For the purposes of this Act, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.

Section 11(1)

For the purposes of this Act, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.

This duty or obligation on the Plaintiff is further amplified in Section 11(4) of NRCD 323 which reads:

Section 11(4):

In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence which on the totality of the evidence leads a reasonable mind to conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.

See also Sarkodie v. F. K. A. Company Ltd (2009) SCGLR 65.

 

There is no evidence before this court to establish that the Defendant’s driver was negligent. There is also no proof to establish that he was drunk on the day of the incident. Although the Plaintiff has repeatedly said both in her witness statement and under cross examination that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, she has called no evidence in support of this fact. If the driver had been drunk at the scene of the accident, she should have brought in witnesses to attest to that fact. Had he been drunk, as she asserted, the Police Report i.e. Exhibit D, ought to have stated that the driver upon being breathalyzed, had a quantity of alcohol in his bloodstream which was over and above the permitted limit. There was a dearth of evidence on this fact and since same remains unproven, the court cannot make a positive finding in the Plaintiff’s favour. The issue of whether or not the Defendant’s driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident is therefore answered in the negative.

 

The Plaintiff has deposed in her witness statement at paragraph 14 as follows:

As a result of the promise by the Defendant’s representatives to repair or replace the vehicles involved, the parties agreed with the police not to prosecute the defendant’s said driver.

This statement implies that the Defendant’s driver was at fault but prosecution was not carried out due to the fact that an agreement had been reached to repair or replace the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The evidence on record was that there was no prosecution because the docket was closed. The incident was ruled an accident.

 

The Court however finds that the Plaintiff suffered damage due to the Defendant’s driver running into her car but it is unable to make a finding of negligence against him as the case docket was closed as “Accidental”. There is no proof that the docket was closed due to the agreement to replace the vehicle. Furthermore, the holding in the case of Mensah v. Dabanka (1962) 2 GLR 178 was to the effect that an employer is liable for the negligent driving of his servant. The Defendant would only become liable in negligence if it was proven that the Defendant’s driver was negligent. It was incumbent on the Plaintiff to prove her allegations of negligence on a preponderance of probabilities. And as Adade JSC put it succinctly in Nartey v. Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd (1987/88) 2 GLR 314 at 344:

“A person who comes to court no matter what the claim is must be able to make a case for the court to consider otherwise he fails.”

 

This brings the court to a consideration of the issue of: Whether or not the Defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence of its driver?

For the Defendants to be vicariously liable for their driver’s actions, the following must be established:

1. That there must exist a relationship of employer and employee.

2. The employee must have committed a tort for which he is always personally liable.

3. The tort must have been committed in the course of the employment of the employee. (See Blackstone’s LLB, Learning Texts – Law of Vicarious Liability – John Hodgson and John Lewthwaite.)

 

In Ansah v. Boye & West and South African Mines Ltd (1956) WALR 219 @ 226, the court held:

“A master must not lightly be exonerated from liability. He selects his lorry driver and places him in charge of mechanism which can become an instrument of destruction in the control of an unskilled or negligent servant engaged on his master’s business, but the servant must be at the time on the master’s business.”

 

It was up to the Defendants to lead evidence either to prove that the driver was not their employee or if he was, at that material time, he was not on their business. In this case, they have admitted that the driver was their employee. They failed to establish that on the day of the incident he was not driving International Bus with Registration No. GS 9221-09 at their behest. In the case of Abuaku v. Tetteh (1962) 2 GLR 165 the court held that where a Plaintiff in an action for negligence proves that damage had been caused by a Defendant’s motor car, the fact of ownership of the motor car is prima facie evidence that the motor car at the material time was being driven by the owner or his servant or his agent. If there were facts inconsistent with negligence, it was for the Defendants to prove them.

 

Applying this to the facts of the instant case, the Court finds that the driver who caused the accident was in the Defendant’s employ. Had he been negligent in his duties, the Defendant would have been vicariously liable for negligence. However, in this case, there has been no evidence of negligence on his part. There were facts inconsistent with negligence when Exhibit D ruled out negligence and rather pronounced that the incident was an accident. But the fact remains that there was damage caused to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

 

Whilst negligence has been ruled out, the damage whether accidental or not was caused by the Defendant’s driver and any liability attached to the driver who was in Defendant’s employ would also attach automatically to the Defendant. The Plaintiff should not be out of pocket just because a finding of negligence could not be made against the Defendant’s driver. This brings the Court to the next issue for consideration which is:

 

a. Whether or not the value of the Plaintiff’s damaged Kia Ronda vehicle at the time of the accident was worth GH¢50,000.00?

The Plaintiff stated at paragraph 9 of her Witness Statement thus:

The market value for my vehicle at the time of the accident was GHC50, 000.00.

 

In Ababio v. Akwasi III (1994/95) GBR 774 the principle the Court laid down is that it is the duty of the Plaintiff to prove his case i.e. he must prove what he alleges. The burden of proof only shifts to the Defence to lead sufficient evidence to tip the scale in his favour when on a particular issue the Plaintiff leads some evidence to prove its claim. The only evidence led which related to the value of the vehicle was the fact that the vehicle was purchased at $13,500.00 and at the time the ratio of the cedi to the dollar was $1 to GH¢1.50.

 

According to the Plaintiff, at the time of the accident, the ratio of the cedi to the dollar was $1 is to GH¢4.00.

 

Exhibit 2 which is the insurance form indicates that the amount insured was GH¢22,500.00. The Court finds that the amount the car was valued at in the insurance policy was GH¢22,500.00. The current market value may have been GH¢50,000.00 but there was no evidence to buttress this. Though the car was purchased at $13,500.00 this was at a time when the ratio of the dollar to the cedi was $1: GH¢1.50. The Plaintiff cannot use the ratio 1: 4 which pertained at the time of the accident to make her calculations and to claim same from the Defendant. Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that cars depreciate and do not appreciate over time.

 

b. Whether or not the Plaintiff has been fully compensated by her insurer Metropolitan Insurance Company Ltd for the replacement of her damaged vehicle?

Exhibit 2 is self explanatory. The Plaintiff insured her vehicle comprehensively for GH¢22,500.00. She was paid GH¢20,250.00 which was the claim less 10% policy excess. The Plaintiff had by accepting this payment been fully compensated by her insurer for the replacement of her damaged vehicle. She cannot sue for another payment in respect of a vehicle she has received full compensation for.

 

c. Whether or not the Plaintiff’s claim is vitiated by fraud?

In Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 the court held that fraud is proven when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. The court held further that if fraud be proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.

When an issue of fraud was raised in Brown v. Quarshigah (2003/2004) SCGLR 930, the court per Twum JSC @p. 946 quoting from Lord Esher in Le Lievre v. Gould (1893) 1 QB 491 @ 498 stated:

“At common law a charge of fraud is such a terrible thing to bring against a man that it cannot be maintained in any court unless it is shown that he had a wicked mind. In Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, the House of Lords held that an absence of honest belief is essential to constitute fraud. In short, fraud is dishonesty”.

 

Section 12(1) of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities.

Section 12(2):

Preponderance of the probabilities’ means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence.

In Re Ashalley Botwe Lands: Adjetey Agbosu & Others v. Ebenezer Nikoi Kotey & Others (2003/2004) 1 SCGLR 420 @ 444 the court held as follows:

It is trite learning that by the statutory provisions of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), the burden of producing evidence in any given case is not fixed but shifts from party to party at various stages of the trial depending on the issue(s) asserted or denied.

 

The Plaintiff has stated that the Defendant had agreed to replace her vehicle. It was in pursuit of this replacement that the Plaintiff applied for her insurance and expected the Defendant whether rightly or wrongly to top up the insurance payment to assist her to acquire a replacement vehicle. There is no evidence that she set out to defraud the Defendant. The allegation of fraud though pleaded and particularized was not proven.

 

d. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to her claim?

It is well established that the call for proof on the preponderance of probabilities does not require an inflexible proof either beyond reasonable doubt or with mathematical exactitude or precision as would fit a jigsaw puzzle. Preponderance of probability connoted an element of doubt or uncertainty and recognized that where there were two choices it was sufficient if the choice selected was more probable than the choice rejected. (See Bisi v. Tabiri alias Asare (1987/88) GLR 360)

 

The Plaintiff insured her vehicle for GH¢22,500.00 which she had stated was the value of the insurable interest. She had received that amount from her insurers. The only person entitled to a claim from the Defendant on that score would be the insurers and not the Plaintiff. Having received a pay out from her insurers, the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim same from the Defendant. Her claim for GH¢50,000.00 is therefore dismissed. She has made a claim for damages for loss of use of the vehicle being GH¢150.00 a day from the date of the accident being 13th January 2013 to date of replacement of vehicle or date of final payment. She claimed this amount as being the cost of transporting herself to work and her children to school. It was her case that she lived at Teshie Nungua and worked at IPS, Legon. Her children attended school in between.

 

She has sued for an amount of GH¢150.00. In her Exhibit G which is a letter dated May 1, 2013 from her Solicitors to the Defendant, it is stated at paragraph 3 thus:

Our client further instructs that due to a delay in resolving this matter, she is incurring huge expenses, to wit she spends about a GH¢100.00 on transportation daily nod she has been doing so for the past three months.

 

The Court finds that the Plaintiff was without the use of a vehicle and would have had to rely on some other means of transportation to carry out her duties and to transport her children to school. Since this only happened due to the Defendant’s driver having run into her vehicle, it is only reasonable that the Defendant be made to pay for her expenses which she had to incur as a consequence of the accident which occurred on 13th January 2013. She received a cheque from the insurers on 28th February 2013. The Defendant would be liable to pay an amount of GH¢100.00 per day for 34 working days from the period 13th January 2013 till 28th February 2013 excluding weekends. This brings the amount to GH¢3,400.00. I would allow GH¢50.00 for weekends which consisted of 12 days equaling GH¢600.00. The grand total is GH¢4,000.00 which is payable with interest from 28th February 2013 up to and inclusive of the date of final payment.

 

Costs follow the event and are at the discretion of the court. It is provided for in Order 74 r. 2(3), 2(4) and 2(5) of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2004 CI 47 thus:

(3) Without prejudice to the powers and discretion of the Court, an award of cost shall ordinarily be designed to

(a) compensate for expenses reasonably incurred and court fees paid by the party in whose favour the award is made and

(b) provide reasonable remuneration for the lawyer of that party in respect of work done by the lawyer.

(4) In assessing the amount of costs to be awarded to any party, the Court may have regard to

(a) the amount of expenses, including travel expenses, reasonably incurred by that party or that party's lawyer or both in relation to the proceedings;

(b) the amount of court fees paid by that party or that party's lawyer in relation to the proceedings;

(c) the length and complexity of the proceedings;

(d) the conduct of the parties and their lawyers during the proceedings: and

(e) any previous order as to costs made in the proceedings.

(5) When the Court adjudges or orders any costs to be paid, the amount of the costs shall, if practicable, be summarily determined by the Court at the time of making the judgment or order, and shall be stated in the order.

 

It is in this Court’s view that the Defendant would have been best served by taking advantage of the pre-trial mediation session to settle this matter. Instead, it decided to battle it out in court. The accident although not from its driver’s negligence was caused by its driver’s fault. It would be unreasonable to expect the Plaintiff to be out of pocket for circumstances over which she had not control. Being a Christian Institution, the Defendant would be conversant with the Bible and particularly with Matthew 5:25-26 (King James Version) thus:

25. Agree with thine adversary quickly while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the Judge, and the Judge deliver thee to the officer, and though be cast into prison.

26. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.

 

Having considered all the factors listed in Order 74 of CI 47, costs of GH¢10,000.00 is awarded against Defendant. In sum, the Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed save her suit for loss of use of her car which has been assessed at GH¢4,000.00 payable with interest from 28th February 2013 up to and inclusive of the date of final judgment.

 

Counsel both promised to furnish the court with its written addresses. However, at the time of writing this judgment, no such address had been filed. The Court came to its judgment without the benefit of learned Counsels’ addresses.

 

(SGD)

JENNIFER A. DODOO

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

 

 

 

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