IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)
ACCRA - A.D 2016
CHRYSOLITE A. AGYRAKWA - (Plaintiff)
JOYCELYN AVEDZI - (Defendant)
DATE: 18TH MARCH, 2016
SUIT NO: OCC 43/2014
JUDGES: SAMUEL K. A. ASIEDU, JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT
MS. EVA OKYERE WITH MS. FREDA BOATENG FOR THE PLAINTIFF
MR. CHARLES AMENYAGLO FOR THE DEFENDANT
The plaintiff and the defendant are both nurses at the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra. In the year 2012 the defendant caused notices to be placed at certain sections of the premises of the hospital stating that she was in the position to assist her colleagues import cars from the United States of America. Following the said notices, the plaintiff approached the defendant and expressed her interest and desire in acquiring a 2010 model Toyota Corolla. The parties then entered into negotiations after which the plaintiff paid some money to the defendant to be used in buying and shipping the car from the United States. Upon the arrival of the car in the country it was delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant some days after it had been cleared from the harbour. After using the car for a while, the plaintiff said she was no longer interested in the car and therefore asked the defendant for a refund of the money which she paid towards the purchase of the car. The defendant did not oblige the plaintiff’s request. The plaintiff therefore caused to issue the instant writ of summons, on the 5th day March 2015, against the defendant claiming
a. An order for specific performance of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant or in the alternative, a refund of the amount GH₵17,000 being part of the purchase price paid.
b. Interest on the part of the part payment of the purchase price mentioned above.
Damages for breach of contract.
d. A refund of an amount of GH₵10,470 being costs incurred for the repairs and clearing of the car. e. Interest on the above stated amount at the prevailing interest rate from July 2013 to date of final payment.
f. An order directing the defendant to pay the duties and taxes on the said Toyota S/Car 2009 model for the purpose of restoring the plaintiff’s waiver concession.
g. Costs inclusive of professional fees.
The defendant entered Appearance and later filed her defence after the writ and the statement of claim had been served on her. After the close of pleadings and the failure of pre-trial settlement proceedings the matter was set down for hearing at which the plaintiff gave evidence and called witnesses to close her case. Thereafter, the defendant also gave evidence and closed her case without calling any witness.
The first issue raised by the pleadings is whether the defendant is into the sale of cars. This is so because in paragraphs 3 and 4 of her statement of claim, the plaintiff has averred that the defendant made an offer to sell cars to interested staff of the hospital as a result of which the plaintiff indicated her willingness to acquire from the defendant a Toyota Corolla S/Car, 2010 model. The defendant has denied the plaintiff’s allegation in paragraph 3 of her statement of defence and has asserted that she rather informed her friends of her ability to assist them acquire used cars from abroad. In such circumstances, sections 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act require the party asserting the claim to lead credible evidence in proof of his claim. In the instant matter, the burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence to establish the allegation that the defendant sells cars. See Ababio vs. Akwasi III [1994-1995] GBR 774 where it was held that:
“A party whose pleading raised an issue essential to the success of the case assumed the burden of proving such issue. The burden only shifted to the [other party] when [such a party] had adduced evidence to establish the claim”
At the trial, the plaintiff and her witness Ibrahim Azinga Zakaria PW3 herein gave evidence on this allegation and also stated that the defendant posted notices around the premises of the hospital. A copy of the said notice was exhibited by the defendant as exhibit CE5. The said exhibit bears the inscription “Do you want to drive your own car? Pay less and drive any car of your choice.” A telephone number is also stated for interested persons to reach the advertiser. It is not clear from the said notice whether the cars which could be driven after one had paid less were readily available with the advertiser. What is clear from the pleadings as well as the evidence on record is that the defendant was to assist in the importation of any such car from the United States. The advertisement is in the nature of an invitation to treat. Therefore, if the plaintiff had not approached the defendant and expressed her desire to own a car through the assistance of the defendant, the court wonders how the defendant could compel the plaintiff to buy a car when the plaintiff had no intention to own one. The second and the fifth questions asked by the plaintiff’s lawyer under cross examination of the defendant even show that the plaintiff knew that the defendant does not sell cars but that the defendant offered to assist her colleagues at the hospital acquire cars from outside Ghana. The court is of the view therefore that the plaintiff has not proved her allegation that the defendant sells cars or that the defendant is into the business of the sale of cars. On the contrary what is clear from the evidence as a whole is that the defendant offered to assist her colleagues acquire cars from abroad and not that the defendant sells cars.
It is not in issue from the pleadings that the plaintiff expressed interest in acquiring a 2010 model Toyota Corolla saloon car. It is also not in dispute that the price of the car was fixed at GH₵19,000 and that the plaintiff paid a deposit of GH₵15,000 to the defendant. Again from the pleadings the court finds as a fact that the car was imported in the name of the plaintiff for which reason the bill of lading, number USCQG119079 as indicated on exhibit CE3i, bore the plaintiff’s name as the consignee of the imported car. It is also not in dispute that after the arrival of the car at the port of Tema in Ghana, the defendant demanded from and the plaintiff paid to the defendant an amount of GH₵2,000 which was part payment of the remaining cost of the vehicle and thus bringing the total payment made by the plaintiff in respect of the cost of the car to GH₵17,000. The GH₵2,000, which was paid by the plaintiff, according to the defendant, was to enable her meet clearing charges at the port.
TOYOTA COROLLA-2009 OR 2010
The plaintiff has averred that the defendant is in breach of the contract between them to import for her a 2010 model Toyota Corolla and that, instead, the car which the defendant imported for her was a 2009 model. The defendant had denied this allegation insisting that the car which was delivered to the plaintiff was a 2010 model. It therefore behoves upon the plaintiff to lead cogent evidence in proof of her allegation.
The plaintiff gave evidence and called one Elijah Obuobi an Auto Electrician who testified that upon examining the said car, he found it to be a 2009 model. The plaintiff also testified to the effect that she had the car examined at Toyota Ghana where it was confirmed to be a 2009 model. Strangely enough, the plaintiff did not attach any document to lend credence to these examinations which allegedly confirmed the car to be a 2009 model instead of a 2010 model. In particular given the stature of Toyota Ghana Limited and that company’s experience as far as Toyota cars are concerned, it is not unreasonable to expect that if in fact that company had examined the plaintiff’s car as alleged they would have issued a report on their findings. However no report on the alleged examination was tendered by the plaintiff. On the contrary, exhibits CE3b, CE 3c, CE3e, CE3f, CE3i, CE4b, among others, shows that the vehicle which was imported and delivered to the plaintiff is a 2010 model Toyota Corolla. Again, it ought to be emphasized that these documents were procured from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service which is the State Agency in Ghana in charge of examining and assessing tax on vehicles imported into the country. Exhibit CE6b was procured by the plaintiff herself and the said exhibit shows quite clearly that the car delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant is a 2010 Toyota Corolla. It also ought to be emphasized that these documents are exhibits tendered by the plaintiff in support of her claim and as stated the exhibits rather support the case of the defendant that the car in question is a 2010 model Toyota Corolla. In this regard the principle of law enunciated in Asante vs. Bogyabi  GLR 232 comes into play that:
“Where the evidence of one party on an issue in a suit was corroborated by witnesses of his opponent, whilst that of his opponent on the same issue stood uncorroborated even by his own witnesses, a court ought not to accept the uncorroborated version in preference to the corroborated one unless for some good reason (which must appear on the face of the judgment) the court found the corroborated version incredible or impossible.”
The court therefore finds and holds that the car which was imported and delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant is a 2010 Toyota Corolla model and not a 2009 model.
From the pleadings and the evidence on record the court finds that the car was delivered to thenplaintiff by the defendant on the 1st day of July, 2013. The plaintiff stated in her evidence that the car was in a state of total dilapidation when it was delivered to her and that the covering on the right side mirror was removed, the car had broken bumpers and also had three wheel caps instead of four. The plaintiff upon receiving the car insisted on getting a mechanic to examine the car before paying the balance on the cost price.
THE STATE OF THE CAR
There is evidence on record that on the day in question the car was driven to the house of the plaintiff. Indeed, if the car was truly in a state of dilapidation as alleged by the plaintiff one would reasonably expect the plaintiff to reject the car there and then.
According to the plaintiff she found, even, days after the delivery of the car to her, that the car was a flood–salvaged car and that there were so many problems with the car. It has been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the car was not in a good condition at the time it was delivered to the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this discovery the plaintiff pleaded in paragraph 16 of her statement of claim that:
“The plaintiff says that despite her shock at the aforementioned discovery, the plaintiff decided to repair the car in order to save her duty waiver concession”.
The court therefore finds and holds that all the defects in the car notwithstanding, the plaintiff waived her right to reject the car. Indeed, the plaintiff accepted the car in the condition in which it was delivered to her and that by her acceptance title in the said car passed to the plaintiff. Sections 25 and 26 of the Sale of Goods Act are very instructive. The sections provide that:
“25. Goods must be ascertained
Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods the property in the goods is not transferred to the buyer unless the goods are ascertained.
26. When property passes
(1) Subject to section 25, the property in the goods passes under a contract of sale when the parties intend it to pass.
(2) Unless a different intention is apparent, the property in the goods passes under a contract of sale when they are delivered to the buyer.
(3) Where goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or “on sale or return” or any other similar terms, then, in the absence of a contrary intention, the property in the goods passes to the buyer
(a) When the buyer signifies the buyer’s approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction;
(b) if the buyer does not signify the buyer’s approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiration of that time, and if a time has not been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time.”
In the instant matter, the car became an ascertained good when the car arrived in Ghana and the defendant cleared it at the port, kept it in her house and the plaintiff identified the car at the defendant’s house. And, when the car was delivered to the plaintiff, property therein passed to her as soon as the car was accepted by her. Indeed, the court finds from the evidence on record that the plaintiff kept the car and used it for a period of nine (9) months before purporting to reject same. This finding is supported by an answer given by the plaintiff when she stated under cross examination that “they brought the vehicle to me on the 1st July, 2013 almost at 6 pm and I gave it back to her on the 7th March, 2014.” An acceptance of goods sold is clearly defined in section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1962 Act 137. According to section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act
The buyer accepts the goods when the buyer
(a) Intimates to the seller that the buyer accepts the goods, or
(b) Does not, within a reasonable time after delivery of the goods, inform the seller that the buyer rejects the goods, or
(c) Wrongfully refuses or neglects to place the goods at the disposal of the seller after notifying the seller that the buyer rejects the goods.”
The plaintiff after taking delivery of the car in the instant matter kept and used it for a period of nine months and even had an accident with the car. This act of the plaintiff is a clear signal or indication of her acceptance of the car which the defendant delivered to her. The plaintiff also confirmed her acceptance of the car by virtue of her averment in paragraph 16 of her statement of claim which has been quoted above. A buyer of a second hand or used car cannot keep the car and use it for a period of nine months and turn round to say that she did not accept the car.
WARRANTY OR CONDITION
It has been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that by virtue of the provision in section 13(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, the plaintiff was entitled to an implied condition that the car was free from defects which were neither declared nor known to her before or at the time when the contract was made.
Section 13(1) provides as follows:
13. Quality and fitness of the goods
(1) Subject to this Act and to any other enactment, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for a particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale except
(a) that there is an implied condition that the goods are free from defects which are not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract is made, but that condition is not an implied condition
(i) where the buyer has examined the goods in respect of defects, which should have been revealed by the examination;
(ii) in the case of a sale by sample, in respect of defects which could have been discovered by a reasonable examination of the sample;
(b) where the goods are not sold by the seller in the ordinary course of the seller’s business, in respect of defects of which the seller was not, and could not reasonably have been aware;
that where the goods are of a description which are supplied by the seller in the course of the seller’s business and the buyer expressly or by implication makes known the purpose for which the goods are required, there is an implied condition that the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose.
From the evidence on record it is clear that at the time that the plaintiff sought the assistance of the defendant to import a car for her and at the time that the defendant agreed to assist the plaintiff, the particular car that was delivered to the plaintiff had not been ascertained. Even the defendant herself had not sighted the very car till it arrived in the country and it was cleared from the port. From the evidence the instruction for the purchase of a car as requested by the plaintiff was relayed by the defendant to her brother-in-law in the United States of America.
Assuming therefore that section 13(1)(a) is even applicable to the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant herein, that is, if there could be implied into the contract a condition that the car was free from defects which were not declared or known to the plaintiff herein being the buyer, at the time of the contract, the court holds that any such implied condition is quickly negated by section 13 (1)( a)(
by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to examine the car, as stated above, after which she expressed her willingness to accept the car as it was in accordance with paragraph 16 of her statement of claim. Counsel rightly quoted the law as stated in Continental Plastics Engineering Co Ltd vs. IMC Industries-Technik GMBH  SCGLR 298 that “When the buyer has examined the goods, the seller cannot be held liable for defects which ought to have been discovered on examination.”
However, the court does not think that section 13(1)(a) is applicable to this case. This is so because the section deals with the disclosure or declaration of defects in the goods to the buyer ‘at the time when the contract is made.’ As noted hereinbefore, at the time that the parties agreed that a car should be imported for the benefit of the plaintiff herein, the particular car that was delivered to the plaintiff had not been ascertained or even purchased. Hence, it was not possible for the defendant to make any declaration or disclosure of any known defects in the car to the plaintiff. The defendant has stated that she was not a car dealer and was also not in a position to know of any latent defects in the car. In Georgia Hotel Ltd. vs. Silver Star Auto Ltd  2 SCGLR 1277, the court stressed the point at page 1290 that:
Under section 13(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), a buyer can avail himself of the implied condition that goods purchased are free from defects which are not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract is made. However, there is no such implied condition where the buyer has examined the goods in respect of defects which should have been revealed by the examination. Accordingly section 13(1) can only avail a buyer where there are latent defects in the goods which could not be revealed by examination at the time of the contract of sale. Under the Sale of Goods Act, 1962 the buyer bears the burden to prove the existence of latent defects in goods bought at the time the contract was concluded. In order for there to be a breach of section 13 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, a purchaser must show that the seller of the vehicle knew or was in the first place aware of defects in the vehicle they sold to him at the time of sale or delivery, and also that the seller deliberately or negligently failed to disclose his knowledge of the defects to the purchaser.
REJECTION OF THE CAR
The next question that follows naturally for determination is whether the plaintiff in this matter has a right to reject the Toyota Corolla car delivered to her by the defendant. The plaintiff’s reasons for purporting to reject the car are captured in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 of her witness statement filed on the 3rd day of July 2015. In a nutshell, the vehicle developed a fault which caused the plaintiff to send it to a mechanic shop for repairs but tried as the mechanics did the car would not start so the plaintiff invited the defendant to the said workshop where the plaintiff handed over the car to the defendant and then ‘made it clear to her that I (the plaintiff) did not want the car again’. This incident, according to the evidence on record, happened nine months after the plaintiff had accepted the car from the defendant.
There is evidence on record that after taking delivery of the car the plaintiff used it to go to work and even on one occasion, the plaintiff was involved in an accident with the car and damaged it in the process. There is also evidence on record that the car was not registered when it was handed over to the plaintiff and that it was two weeks after the plaintiff had taken delivery of the car that she applied and had the vehicle registered in her name. The plaintiff also admitted under cross examination that she was very much aware that the car she bought was not a brand new car and that it was a used car.
In the light of the evidence on record therefore the court is firmly of the opinion that having accepted the car and used same for as long as nine months the plaintiff lost her right to reject the car. A buyer who has accepted goods delivered to her under a sales contract has no right within the meaning of section 51(1) of the Sale of Goods Act to reject the goods. As stated in the case of Rockson vs. Armah  2 GLR 116 at 119
“It seems to me that the right to reject is lost by any unreasonable delay in doing so: see Fisher, Reeves & Co., Ltd. v. Armour & Co., Ltd.  3 K.B. 614, C.A. and Chao v. British Traders and Shippers  1 All E.R. 779. Where a buyer elects to keep a defective car for an inordinately long time, it is not open to him thereafter to avoid the transaction.”
The court therefore declares as invalid the attempt by the plaintiff to reject the car which she had accepted and used for nine months. Before the plaintiff accepted the car, she had seen it, according to her, at the defendant’s house. When it was delivered to her she intimated to the defendant that she would not pay the balance of the cost of the car till she had had the car examined by a mechanic. The plaintiff subsequently got a mechanic examined the car, found that the car was a flood-salvaged car and had Toyota Ghana, according to her, confirm the fact that the car was a flooded car and also not a 2010 model Toyota but a 2009 model. Despite all these, and as pleaded in paragraph 16 of her statement of claim, the plaintiff went ahead to accept the car, registered the car and used it for nine good months. It is certainly too late in the day to reject the car. The car is for the plaintiff and it remains her property even up to this date.
COST OF REPAIRS
The plaintiff claims from the defendant the cost of repairs which she had carried out on the car amounting to GH₵7,970. In her witness statement, the plaintiff exhibited receipts which, according to her, were issued to her when she purchased spare parts to service the car. As already pointed out, the plaintiff did not buy a new car so naturally one should not expect that the car will run without problems. In respect of the tyres which the plaintiff replaced for instance, the plaintiff admitted in cross examination that she used the car for four (4) months before changing the tyres and even then exhibit CE2k shows that the plaintiff changed only two tyres although she claims to have changed all four tyres under the car. On exhibit CE2L the plaintiff claims to have bought plugs and ATF fluid for the car among others. It is noteworthy that these things were purchased five months after the plaintiff had taken delivery of and used the car. In the opinion of the court these are things which every owner of a car has got to change from time to time in order to ensure the efficient performance of the car and barring any agreement between the parties to the contrary, the court does not see why the vendor of the car should be called upon to bear the cost of such servicing. The plaintiff also says she changed the gear box after she had used the car for four months. She also bought fog-lights and alarm which she fixed to the car and is praying to recover the costs of these items from the defendant.
The court wishes to say that most of the items which the plaintiff bought either as replacement of parts or by way of servicing the car are things which one should expect to buy at a point in time to service a used car and for that matter the vendor of the car or the person through whose assistance the car was procured cannot be called upon to make good those expenses. Indeed, as soon as property in the car passed to the plaintiff, it came with all the risk that accompanies the ownership of a car and it includes the cost of servicing the car unless the parties have agreed to specifically exclude such risk from passing to the buyer. This position of the law is clear from section 27 (1) (2) of the Sale of Goods Act which states that:
“27. Transfer of risk
(1) The risk in the goods in a contract of sale is transferred to the buyer when the parties intend it to be transferred.
(2) Unless a different intention is apparent, the goods are at the seller’s risk until the property in them passes to the buyer, after which the goods are at the risk of the buyer”.
See also Yirenkyi vs. Tormekpey [1987-1988] 1 GLR 533 at 538.
In this case, as stated earlier, the property in the car passed to the plaintiff when the car was delivered to her and she accepted same and started using it. The passage of property came with the risk in the property. See Rockson vs. Armah (supra) at page 119. That being the case, and in the absence of a specific agreement that the defendant shall continue to bear the risk in the car delivered, the plaintiff has no right to demand that the defendant bears the cost of repairing the car.
As part of her claim, the plaintiff has asked for ‘an order directing the defendant to pay the duties and taxes on the said Toyota S/Car 2009 model for the purpose of restoring the plaintiff’s waiver concession’ however, the court has already found that the plaintiff could not adduce cogent evidence to support the allegation that the car imported for her was a 2009 model. On the contrary her evidence supported the defendant’s assertion that the car was a 2010 model. The plaintiff can therefore not pray for an order that the defendant be made to pay the duties on the car. Even if the plaintiff had succeeded in adducing evidence to prove that the car was a 2009 model, she still could not succeed in her claim in view of the fact that, she had examined the car and got to know the year of manufacture and the condition of the car and then accepted the car and used same for nine months within which she got the car involved in an accident, damaging it in the process and for that matter, she cannot in law purport to reject the said car so as to invite the court to make an order for the defendant to pay the duties on the said car in order that her (the plaintiff’s) waiver concession may be restored.
From the totality of the evidence on record, the court holds that the plaintiff has failed to prove her claims against the defendant. The plaintiff’s claims are accordingly dismissed.
The defendant filed a counterclaim in which she claims, among others, against the plaintiff for GH₵2,000 being the balance due on the car. The court finds that notwithstanding the denial by the plaintiff in her Amended Reply and Defence to Counterclaim filed on the 4th May 2015, of the claim made by the defendant, the plaintiff admitted owing the defendant the sum of GH₵2,000 on the cost of the car. This admission was made in answer to the first question put to the plaintiff in cross examination thus
“Q. Madam. A. as it stands today, how much you owe the defendant on the cost of the vehicle
A. Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵2000).”
In the opinion of the court the principle of law enunciated in Asante vs. Bogyabi (supra) on admissions made in support of the case of an adversary applies to the admission made by the plaintiff herein in support of the defendant’s claim under discussion. The court holds therefore that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant in the sum of GH₵2,000. The court will therefore decree judgment in favour of the defendant to recover the sum of GH₵2,000 from the plaintiff.
The defendant also claims from the plaintiff the security and storage cost on the car. The defendant’s evidence in support of this claim is that in March 2014 the plaintiff informed the defendant’s husband that the car had developed a fault and that an amount of GH₵1,200 was being demanded as the cost of repairs and that the defendant’s husband should provide funds for the repairs. The defendant then had her Auto Electrician repair the car which was then sent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff refused to accept the car. The defendant was compelled, as a result, to send the car home and then caused her solicitor to write formally to the plaintiff to come for the car failing which she will be made to pay for the cost of keeping the car safe. The plaintiff did not go for the car but caused the instant writ to issue. The defendant then engaged a day time security, at the cost of GH₵15 per day, to keep watch over the car from 1st of June 2014. As already stated the plaintiff in her Amended Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, had denied the defendant’s claims and therefore the defendant is duty bound under the Evidence Act to lead evidence in proof of her claim.
The court finds however that, short of repeating her averment on oath, the defendant has failed to provide cogent evidence in respect of the hiring of the day time security and also of the payment of the sum of GH₵15 per day to the said security person. No letter of engagement was tendered by the defendant and not a single pay voucher was tendered to show receipt by the alleged security person of the sum of GH₵15 per day from the defendant.
It has been submitted on behalf of the defendant that the evidence of the defendant on this claim was not challenged by the plaintiff and therefore deemed to be admitted. The principle was re-stated in Quagraine vs. Adams  GLR 599. However before an adversary could be said to have admitted a claim by his failure to cross examine the proponent of that claim must have passed the test laid down in sections 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD 323. The sections provide that
“14. Allocation of burden of persuasion
Except as otherwise provided by law, unless it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence that party is asserting.
17. Allocation of burden of producing evidence
Except as otherwise provided by law,
(a) The burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof;
(b) The burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact.”
This implies that the proponent must have first led cogent evidence in proof of his assertion or claim and once that bridge is crossed, the burden then shifts to the adversary to lead contrary evidence in disproof of the evidence of the proponent either through cross examination or examination in chief or both. It is at this stage that the adversary could be said to have admitted, sub-silentio, the proved claim of the proponent if he fails to cross examine the proponent on the evidence led or fails to give evidence to the contrary. Thus, without first leading credible evidence to prove his claim, a proponent cannot say that the claim must be adjudged in his favour for the mere reason that his adversary failed to cross examine him. This is so because whether the adversary crossed examined the proponent or not, the fact still remains that the claim has not been proved by the adduction of credible evidence. In the instant matter, the defendant led no credible evidence to establish her claim that she employed a day time security to keep watch over the car and that the day time security was paid GH₵15 per day. The court will therefore hold that the defendant has failed to prove the claim security and storage cost. The said claim is therefore dismissed.
The defendant also claims from the plaintiff GH₵2,000 being the ‘repair cost paid to the mechanics/auto electricians on plaintiff’s behalf.’ The defendant has tendered in evidence exhibits JA1 and JA2. A summation of the cost stated on the two exhibits comes to GH₵1,650 and not GH₵2000 which the defendant claims. These exhibits tendered in proof of the expenditure incurred on the plaintiff’s vehicle were not challenged in any way by the plaintiff. The court holds that the defendant has succeeded in proving that she incurred cost of GH₵1,650 in repairing the plaintiff’s car after the plaintiff had abandoned the car at her mechanic’s workshop. The plaintiff is therefore liable to make good the said expenses to the defendant. The court will therefore enter judgment in favour of the defendant to recover the sum of GH₵1,650 from the plaintiff.
Costs of Four Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH¢4,000.00) for the Defendant against the Plaintiff.