KUMASI - A.D 2016
MR. KWASI BOADU - (Defendants)

DATE:  12TH APRIL, 2016
SUIT NO:  RPC/120/13

By the endorsement on his writ of summons issued from the Registry of this court on 28/05/13, the

Plaintiff herein claimed the under listed reliefs:


An order for the payment of an amount of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis comprising GH¢15,000 outstanding debt on a contract signed with the Defendant to supply the Plaintiff with 350 refined Gold which the Defendant failed and GH¢5000 being an amount of money used by the Plaintiff to repair Defendant's Nissan Frontier Pick-up.


Interest on the amount of GH¢15,000 at the prevailing Commercial rate from 26th day January 2012 until date of payment.


Damages for defaming the Plaintiff




Any other order(s) as the Court may deem just.


Simply put, the Plaintiff's case is that by a memorandum of understanding dated 26/01/2012, the Defendant agreed to supply him 350 blades of refined gold valued at GH¢17,500.00 within one month. The Plaintiff allegedly paid the GH¢17,500 to the Defendant who to repay an amount of GH¢ 25,000.00 to the Plaintiff if he was unable to supply the gold. It is also the Plaintiff's case that when the Defendant failed to supply the gold to him, he refunded GH¢ 12,000.00 but took an additional loan of GH¢2,000.00 and thus leaving an unpaid balance of GH¢15,000.00. The Plaintiff further asserted that the Defendant released his Nissan Frontier pick up vehicle to him to defray the said amount and he




spent an amount of GH¢5000 to maintain it. Thereafter, the Plaintiff maintained that the Defendant used unperceived means to retrieve the said vehicle from him and also went on air to describe him as a thief.


The Defendant amended his earlier statement of defence and in the amended defence filed on 04/04/14, he admitted that the Plaintiff gave him GH¢17,000 to supply him with 350 blades or 35 pounds of refined gold. He alleged that the gold he procured was stolen together with his other property and subsequent to that, it was agreed between the parties that if the gold was retrieved from the suspects, the Defendant would give it to the Plaintiff, but if the Defendant reneged on that agreement, he would pay GH¢25,000.00 to the Plaintiff. The Defendant further asserted that the Plaintiff tricked him and took his Toyota Mini bus with a market value of GH¢22,500.00; unilaterally valued it at GH¢12,000.00 and said he was using it to defray part of his indebtedness. It is also his case that the Plaintiff requested him to bring his Nissan Frontier Pick-Up worth GH¢22,500.00 to convey diesel for their joint business but again seized the keys and drove it away. Thereafter, he reported the matter to the police. He also denied taking GH¢2000 from the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended that he did not defame the Plaintiff and he is also not indebted to him in any way. He then counterclaimed as follows:


A declaration that the seizure of the Defendant's Toyota minibus and an unlicensed Nissan Frontier Pick-Up by the Plaintiff is capricious and unlawful.


An order for the immediate release of the aforementioned vehicles by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.


Or, in the alternative, recovery of the current value of the two vehicles from the Plaintiff.


An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiff, his agents, privies, assigns, etc from selling, hiring, mortgaging, transferring or in any manner taking ownership or dealing with the two vehicles or either of them in such a manner as to deprive the Defendant of his use and/or ownership of the aforementioned vehicles.


Damages for the loss of use occasioned by the seizure of the vehicles at GH¢200.00 per day, for each of them from the date of seizure to the date of their release.




As to be expected, the Plaintiff denied the Defendant's assertions and counterclaims in his amended reply filed on 20/06/14. The issues set down for trial are as follows:




Whether or not the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement, whereby the Defendant received GHS 17,500.00 to supply the Plaintiff with 350 blades of refined gold?


Whether or not the Defendant breached the terms of the agreement?


Whether or not the Gold procured by the Defendant was stolen whereupon the parties reviewed the terms of the old agreement?


Whether or not the Plaintiff and Defendant were in business together?


Whether or not the Plaintiff obtained the Defendant's Toyota Minibus and Nissan pickup through trickery?





Whether or not the Defendant has defamed the Plaintiff?


Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claim?


Whether or not the Defendant is entitled to his counterclaim?


As is all civil suits, the Plaintiff bears the onus of proof of his averments which are denied by the Defendant and vice versa. The requisite standard and degree of proof is "proof by the preponderance of the probabilities" as stated in sections 11(4), 12(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 N.R.C.D. 323. Ansah JSC sufficiently discussed these principles and applied the same in the case of Takoradi Floor Mills v Samir Faris (2005/2006) SCGLR 882 at 884 (holding 5). Before then, Kpegah JSC had expounded the principle in Zambrama v Segbedzie (1991) 2 GLR 221 where he stated:


"The correct proposition is that, a person who makes an averment or assertion, which is denied by his opponent, has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And he does not discharge this burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from which the fact or facts he asserts can properly and safely be inferred. The nature of each averment or assertion determines the degree and nature of that burden".


So in the case before me, I will strictly apply these principles and at the end of the day determine whose version of the rival stories is deserving of a favourable verdict.


The Plaintiff bears both the evidential and burden of persuasion in respect of the first issue for determination which is , whether or not the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement, whereby the Defendant received GH¢17,500.00 to supply the Plaintiff with 350 blades of refined gold?


In support of the Plaintiff's oral account of the said agreement which fall in line with his pleaded case, he tendered in evidence exhibit A. The Defendant denied the existence of any written agreement in paragraph 4 of his amended statement of claim and his lawyer sought to discredit exhibit A on the basis that it does not contain a jurat. That concern will be addressed shortly. Before then, it is worth reproducing the relevant part of exhibit A irrespective of the poor drafting . The Plaintiff and the Defendant are described as the First and second parties respectively in the document. It reads:




That, the FIRST PARTY in the person of KWASI BOADU of BOMFA ANNURURO near KONONGO/ASHANTI has collected an amount of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED GAHAN CEDIS (GH¢17,500.00) from the SECOND PARTY, MR. MAJEED and has promised to give MR. MAJEED GOLD WORTH OF 350 BLADES REFINED within a period of One (1) Month


commencing from this 26th day of January, 2012, to end of February, 2012.


That it has been duly agreed upon by the said two (2) parties that if MR. KWASI BOADU the 1st Party should make it a point that he should honour his promise as agreed upon.


That if Mr. KWASI BOADU fail to honour his promise, Mr. Majeed has every right to take any legal action for the recovery of his said amount as agreed upon that an amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND GHANA CEDIS ( GH¢25,000.00) will be paid to MR. Majeed accordingly.


That at the end of the stipulated period of the said two months, MR. KWASI BOADU should pay an amount of GH¢25,000.00 to MR. MAJEED accordingly.


There is a thumb print on exhibit A attributed to the Defendant and the Plaintiff also signed. On the face of exhibit A, there were witnesses to the execution of the document, namely, Opanin Akwasi




Asare and Mr. Amponsah Charles.


The said Akwasi Asare gave evidence in court as PW1. He told the court that about three years prior to his testimony on 03/12/2015, the Defendant approached the Plaintiff and sought financial assistance of GH¢17,500.00 which he agreed to repay with 350 blades of gold within one month. PW1 testified further that the Defendant said if he was unable to bring the gold, he will pay GH¢25,000.00 to the Plaintiff. He continued that this oral agreement was reduced into writing by one Apau after which the Defendant thumb printed in the presence of his nephew by name Charles. PW1 said he represented the Plaintiff for the document to be prepared after which he took it to him to sign. According to him, Mr. Apau explained the contents of exhibit A to him and the Defendant and they understood the same before they executed it.




I will comment on the absence of a jurat on exhibit A. Generally, an interpretation clause is required when a party who is illiterate in the language in which a document is prepared is expected to execute the same. That is the requirement under the Illiterates Protection Act, 1912 CAP 262. It is provided under section 3 therein as follows:


Sec. 3.  Conditions for persons writing letters for       illiterates.


A person writing a letter or any other document for or at the request of an illiterate person, whether gratuitously or for a reward, shall


clearly and correctly read over and explain the letter or document or cause it to be read over and explained to the illiterate person,


(b)        cause the illiterate person to sign or make a mark at the       foot of the

letter or the other document or to touch the   pen with which the mark is made

at the foot of the letter or the other document,


clearly write the full name and address of the writer on the letter or the other document as writer of it...".


A cursory look at exhibit A shows that the above requirements were not complied with and it was on that basis that the Defendant's counsel at the time challenged the validity of exhibit A.


There are a host of judicial decisions on the legal effect of the absence or presence of a Jurat in a document executed by an illiterate person. One such case is Zambrama v Segbedzie, referred to above where the court said in holding (2) that:


"The principle was firmly established by a stream of decided cases that where an illiterate executed a document which compromised his interest and that document was being cited against him by a party to it or his privy, there was no presumption in favour of the proponent of the document, and against the illiterate person, that the latter appreciated and had an intelligent knowledge of the contents of the document. The party seeking to rely on the document must lead evidence in proof that the document was actually read and interpreted to the illiterate who understood it before signing same. Being a question of fact, the presence or otherwise of an interpretation clause on a document was one of the factors a court should take into account in determining whether the document in question was fully understood by the illiterate. The presence of an interpretation clause in a document was not conclusive of that fact, neither was it a sine qua non. It was still possible for an illiterate to lead evidence outside the document to show that despite the said interpretation clause, he was not made fully aware of the contents of the document to which he made his mark. If a court, after assessing all the available evidence was satisfied, upon the preponderance of the evidence, that the document was read and interpreted to the illiterate person, then the burden of proof would have been discharged by the person relying on the




document. That was because just as it was bad to hold an illiterate to a bargain he would otherwise not have entered into if he fully appreciated it, so also was it equally bad to permit a person to avoid a bargain properly and voluntarily entered into by him under the guise of illiteracy ." See also Duodo & Ors v Adomako &


Adomako ( 2012) 1 SCGLR 198; In Re Will of Bremansu; Akonu- Baffoe v Buaku & Vandyke ( substituted by ) Bremansu (2012) 2 SCGLR 1313 which adequately discussed the legal effect of the absence or presence of a jurat on a document and came to the same conclusion as Kpegah JA did in the Zambrama case.




These judicial decisions envisage a purposive approach to the interpretation of the Illiterates' Protection Act such that the absence of a jurat per se ought not be the sole ground for rejecting a document sought to be enforced against an illiterate person. What is of the essence is credible evidence on record to show that the illiterate person clearly understood the contents of the document sought to be enforced against him or her.




In the instant case, the Defendant admits taking GH¢17,000.00 from the Plaintiff to procure 350 blades of gold for him but he never delivered the said gold to the Plaintiff. PW1 said he witnessed the oral agreement between the parties and that the sum involved was GH¢17,500.00 and not GH¢17,000.00. He has also told the court that he represented the Plaintiff in the preparation of exhibit A and that the maker of the document explained the contents to him and the Defendant as well before they executed it. The Plaintiff has also testified to the contents of exhibit A as representing the agreement he had with the Defendant.




At this point, the burden of persuasion shifted onto the Defendant to proof that the contents of exhibit A were not read over to him. When the Defendant mounted the witness box, he said nothing about exhibit A even though he readily conceded taking an amount of GH¢ 17,000.00 from the Plaintiff. The denials made by the Defendant's previous lawyer during cross-examination will not suffice and i find that the Defendant has been unable to proof by any credible means that he was not made to understand the contents of exhibit A before he made his mark on the same.




The Plaintiff has succeeded in establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant clearly understood the contents of exhibit A before he made his mark on it. I have had no cause to doubt the credibility of the Plaintiff and PW1 in respect of the contents of exhibit A as against the Defendant's conflicting account on the money he received from the Plaintiff.




I am inclined to give preference to the contents of exhibit A and will follow the reasons stated in the case of Yorkwa v Duah (1992-93) GBR 278 (holding 6) thus:


"Whenever there was in existence a written document and oral evidence over a transaction, the practice in the court was to lean favourably towards the documentary evidence, especially if it was authentic and the oral evidence conflicting..."


This was affirmed in the case of Agyei Osae v Agyeifio (2007-2008) SCGLR 499 at 503 per Brobbey JSC.





From the oral account of the Plaintiff and PW1, coupled with exhibit A, I find that the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into an agreement whereby the Defendant received GH¢17,500.00 to supply 350 blades of refined Gold to the Plaintiff failing which the Defendant was to pay GH¢25,000.00 to the Plaintiff. The GH¢ 17,000.00 quoted by the Defendant is inaccurate having regard to the totality of the evidence on record and I so find.




The next issue for determination is whether the Defendant breached the terms of this agreement? The Plaintiff's version of the story is that from exhibit A, the Gold was to be supplied within one month. Even though the Defendant denied this assertion and said the date for the supply was left open, he told the court that he procured the gold but the same was stolen. From the Defendant's own accounts of events, he regularly purchased gold and there is no link between the gold allegedly stolen and the quantity he ought to have supplied to the Plaintiff. What the defendant said in his evidence-in-chief as regards the alleged theft is quite revealing. He testified as follows:




The Plaintiff gave me GH¢17,000.00 to purchase gold from other miners. I supplied the Plaintiff with gold for one year. Later, my 230 blades of gold and GH¢7000 cash were stolen. I reported the matter to the Bekwai police and the suspects were arrested. After the theft, I became indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of GH¢ 17,000.00...".




By the Defendant's own showing, the gold allegedly stolen was far lower than what he was expected to supply to the Plaintiff. What happened to the difference ? Either way, the alleged theft cannot be a valid defence for not fulfilling his obligations under exhibit A. The Defendant ought to have protected his "stock-in-trade" as any prudent reasonable business man would have done under those circumstances.




Having conceded his failure to supply 350 blades of gold to the Plaintiff, I find that the Defendant has breached the agreement he entered with the Plaintiff on that point.




The next two issues are whether or not the Gold procured by the Defendant was stolen whereupon the parties reviewed the old agreement and whether the parties were in business together?


Going by the laid down principle of proof in civil suits, it is the defendant who has to prove that the gold he procured for the Plaintiff was stolen and thereafter, he entered into another agreement with the Plaintiff.




When the Defendant was being cross-examined on his evidence-in-chief as regards the 230 blades of gold allegedly stolen, he told the court that the Plaintiff gave the money to him on 25/09/2011 to procure the gold in issue. This piece of evidence is contrary to the contents of exhibit A where a reasonable inference can be made to the effect that the money was given to the Defendant on 26/01/2012. Thus, if any gold was stolen from the Defendant in September, 2011, of what relevance is that to the agreement for the supply of gold made between the parties on 26/01/2012? I do not find any! Having perused the entire evidence on record, I find that the parties made subsequent oral




arrangements to enable the Defendant settle his indebtedness to the Plaintiff and nothing more. The evidence on record also shows that the parties did some business together in the past but that was unrelated to the monies paid to the Defendant as evidenced by exhibit A.




The next major issue which I have to consider is whether or not the Plaintiff obtained possession of the Defendant's Toyota Minibus and Nissan pickup through trickery? This issue arises from the Defendant's counterclaims and he in enjoined by law to prove the same on the balance of probabilities.




The Defendant's evidence on oath was that he did not sell the Toyota mini bus to the Plaintiff and that the latter seized the bus until the GH¢17,000.00 debt was paid. The following part of the Defendant's evidence in respect of the alleged seizure of the Nissan Frontier pick up is worthy of note:




The Plaintiff agreed that we should start the business again. I brought a Nissan Frontier for the purpose of conveying diesel for the business. When I brought the Nissan frontier, the Plaintiff, Opanin Kwasi Asare and Kufour seized the car. I told them they had stolen the car since I had not sold same to him. The Plaintiff insisted he will only release the vehicle when I paid the money... apart from the GH¢ 17,000.00, I do not owe the Plaintiff."




The Plaintiff's version of the events is that after the Defendant had defaulted in supplying the 350 blades of gold, he was required to pay him GH¢25,000.00 as per their agreement. The Defendant voluntarily drove the said vehicle to the Plaintiff's house and the parties agreed on GH¢12,000.00 as the purchase price and the Defendant's indebtedness was to be reduced by that amount. The Defendant then gave documents covering the vehicle to the Plaintiff and exhibit B was made.




In respect of the Nissan Frontier pick-up, the Plaintiff said the Defendant borrowed an amount of GH¢2000.00 from him to pay for the medical expenses of his child who had been admitted at the hospital and that brought the Defendant's indebtedness to GH¢ 15,000.00. Subsequently, the Defendant released the vehicle to the Plaintiff in satisfaction of the said amount after which he spent GH¢5000 to repair the same. When the Defendant demanded to have the vehicle back, the Plaintiff testified that he will do so willingly if the Defendant refunded the GH¢15,000.00 and the GH¢5000 respectively.




The Defendant called an auto mechanic by name Stephen Areko who worked on the Nissan Frontier at the time the Plaintiff took possession as a witness. He testified as DW2. In sum, the evidence of DW2 was to the effect that it was the Defendant who authorized him to release the Nissan Frontier vehicle to the Plaintiff because he was indebted to the Plaintiff. In cross-examination, DW2 admitted that he released the vehicle in issue to the Plaintiff with the permission of the Defendant.


Clearly, the testimony of DW2 on this point supports the Plaintiff's case that it was the Defendant who voluntarily released the Nissan Frontier to him in satisfaction of his indebtedness. In effect, the





evidence of the Defendant's own witness goes against the Defendants case. The legal effect of this can be seen in the case of Manu v Nsiah (2005/2006) SCGLR 25 (holding 1) thus:




It is a well established rule that where the evidence of a party on a point in a suit is corroborated by witnesses of his opponent, whilst that of his opponent on that same issue stands uncorroborated even by his own witnesses, a court ought not accept the uncorroborated version in preference to the corroborated one, unless for some good and apparent reason, the court finds the corroborated version incredible, impossible or unacceptable"




From the foregoing, the Defendant cannot be regarded as a credible witness within the provisions of section 80 of the Evidence Act, 1975 N.R.C.D. 323 because he lied to the Court about how the Nissan Frontier Vehicle got into the Plaintiff's possession until DW2 set the record straight. I will therefore give preference to the Plaintiff's account that the Defendant released the Nissan Frontier to him voluntarily.




In view of the Defendant's lack of credibility, I will accept the Plaintiff's version of events based on exhibit B that the Defendant sold the Toyota Mini Van to him for GH¢12,000.00 on 11/04/2012. And, on the balance of probabilities, I accept as credible the evidence of PW2, Mohammed Bansi, that it was the Defendant who caused exhibit B to be prepared. The Defendant's denial of having executed exhibit B is just an attempt to blur the court's vision.




From the above findings of fact, I conclude that the Plaintiff did not obtain possession of the Defendant's Toyota Mini bus and Nissan Pick Up through trickery.




Is the Plaintiff entitled to his claim for a refund of GH¢15,000.00 and GH¢5,000.00 respectively from the Defendant? By the combined effect of exhibits A and B, an amount of GH¢13,000.00 is outstanding in respect of the agreement between the parties. The additional GH¢ 2000 was money borrowed from the Plaintiff for a different purpose which the previous lawyer for the Defendant acknowledged whilst cross-examining the Plaintiff on 23/07/2015 as follows:


Q.        It is true the Defendant took GH¢2000 from you but it          was      for a

completely different cause?


A.         Not correct. He collected the GH¢2000 in the presence of   witness so

that he will give the car to me in lieu of his     indebtedness.


It is evident that the Defendant took an additional GH¢2000 from the Plaintiff after the execution of the agreement contained in exhibit A but the repayment was linked to the outstanding balance on exhibit A. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of GH¢2000 from the Defendant. In effect, the Plaintiff has succeeded in establishing the GH¢15,000.00 which the Defendant owes him. He is entitled to be paid that amount.






That apart, I am unable to accept the Plaintiff's bare assertion that he spent an amount of GH¢5,000.00 to repair the Nissan Frontier vehicle. What was the nature of the repairs? Who carried out the repairs and where did the alleged repairs take place? The Plaintiff failed to adduce any reliable and convincing evidence in support of his claim for GH¢5000 allegedly spent in repairing the Defendant's Nissan Frontier. Accordingly, that leg of the claim for refund cannot stand.




From the evidence, the initial amount which the Plaintiff gave to the Defendant was GH¢17,500.00 and upon default in supplying the gold within one month, the Plaintiff was to be paid GH¢25,000.00. The GH¢7,500 difference is sufficient compensation to the Plaintiff for the loss of use of his money. Besides, under an arrangement between the parties, the Defendant sold his Toyota Mini Van to the Plaintiff for GH¢12,000.00 as per exhibit B, and the amount was set off against his indebtedness to the Plaintiff. This was three months after the Plaintiff had given the GH¢17,500.00 to the Defendant. Again, when the Plaintiff took possession of the Defendant's Nissan Frontier, he had the use of same by his own showing prior to this suit. Taking into consideration all these factors, it will be unconscionable for the Plaintiff to demand payment of interest on the sum of GH¢15,000.00 from January 2012 till date of final payment. At best, the Plaintiff will be awarded post judgment interest on that sum.




The Plaintiff has made a further claim for damages for defamation. The particulars were given in paragraph 13 (a) of his Statement of Claim thus:


Describing the Plaintiff as a thief at the radio station to the hearing of all when the Defendant knew that he voluntarily handed over the vehicle to him. The said statement about the Plaintiff has negatively affected the Plaintiff's reputation."




These allegations were denied by the Defendant in paragraph 10 of his amended statement of defence and thereby placing the onus of proof on the Plaintiff.




The case of Amoako v Takoradi Timbers Ltd (1982/83) GLR 69, HC will be considered in discussing the burden of proof on a Plaintiff in a claim for damages for defamation. The court held (holding 2) thus:




In an action for damages for defamation it was not sufficient for the Plaintiff to say that in his self-estimation the words alleged conveyed some obnoxious meaning to him. He must go further to prove that the obnoxious meaning was conveyed to persons other than himself and the words had lowered him in the estimation of those persons; in other words no civil action for libel or slander could be maintained unless the Plaintiff had established that the words complained of had been published to persons other than himself and those persons had understood the words in the defamatory sense attributed to them by the Plaintiff"


The above statement is straight forward and does not need any commentary. It shows what the court expects from a party who makes a claim for damages for slander or libel. The Plaintiff before me gave oral evidence in support of this claim as follows:





I received a call from Fox FM that somebody had reported to them that I had stolen his car. I met a man by name old soldier at Fox FM. After listening to both parties, they also came to a conclusion that I had not stolen the car. They told me to send the car away and upon payment of the money, I should release the car to the Defendant...".


The Plaintiff did not say that the above encounter was a live broadcast or a discussion off air. The most important fact is that in the Plaintiff's own words, he was cleared of any wrong doing by Old Soldier who works for Fox FM. In any case, the Plaintiff was not under any legal obligation to respond to the call from Fox FM but he elected to go to the station and subjected himself to that scrutiny. Since the outcome was in his favour and served the best interest of the parties at that time, how can the Plaintiff complain that he has been defamed?


Moreover, the Defendant has even denied uttering any defamatory words and the best proof was for the host or producer of that Fox FM program to tender a transcript of what actually transpired. The Plaintiff did not call the host or producer as a witness of fact. In effect, the Plaintiff failed to bring that positive proof to the attention of the court.


On the basis of the above, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on him in respect of his claim for damages for defamation and so he losses.


I have already found that the Defendant sold his Toyota Mini Van and voluntarily released his Nissan Frontier Pick-Up vehicle to the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Defendant is not entitled to any declaratory relief that the Plaintiff seized those vehicles unlawfully. The other counterclaims for damages for loss of use, perpetual injunction and recovery of the market value of the two vehicles from the Plaintiff are also baseless and cannot be granted.


Accordingly, I enter judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant in the sum of GH¢15,000.00. The Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest on the GH¢15,000.00 from the date of delivery of judgment till date of final payment. The interest rate will be at the prevailing Bank Rate. The 91 days Bank of Ghana Treasury Bill Rate is to be used as the Prevailing Bank Rate.


further order that the Nissan Frontier Pick Up vehicle in issue which is in the possession of the Plaintiff be preserved by the Registrar of this court at the expense of both parties for a period of 30 days to enable the Defendant pay the judgment debt.


In the event that the Defendant is unable to pay the said judgment debt within 30 days from today, the Registrar is to appoint an INDEPENDENT AND CREDIBLE VALUER to access the current market value of the Nissan Frontier Pick Up Vehicle. Thereafter, the Vehicle will have to be disposed of by Judicial Sale and the proceeds applied to the Judgment debt. If there is any remainder, it shall be paid to the Defendant. However, a reserved price will have to be set by the court before any Judicial Sale can take place.


If the Defendant had been candid, this trial could have been avoided. Yet, by his own mischief, the parties have been in court since May, 2013. Having taken into consideration the provisions of Order 74 of the High Court ( Civil Procedure) Rules 2004, C.I. 47 on the award of cost, I hereby award cost of GH¢3000 against the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.